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In this paper we present an empirical analysis of farmers’ contracting choice in the 
Hungarian milk sector using 2005 milk producer survey data, employing transaction cost 
economics. We focus on analysing some key determinants of farmers’ contracting 
choices: type of contracts, duration, number of contractors, incentives provided in the 
contract and business history of farmers and buyers. Some of the main results include the 
importance and effect of farm size, quantity of milk delivered, planned short and long run 
or contract related investment on farm, the possibility of farmer to influence prices on the 
contracting choices. 
Keywords: transaction costs, contracts, milk products, Hungary. 1.  Introduction 
The combination of transition and globalization since the early 1990s has caused 
dramatic changes in supply chains of transition countries. After almost two decades of 
agricultural policy reforms in transition countries, the agriculture in these countries can 
be still described as facing considerable uncertainties. Contrary to the expectations at the 
early stage of transformation, the farm structure can be characterized by a dual structure 
comprising a very large number of small farms and a small number of large-scale farms, 
based mainly on the successors of former cooperatives and state farms. Small scale farms 
are predominant in terms of farm number in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries (Csáki and Forgács, 2008). Moreover, the subsistence farms also play an 
important role in CEE countries’ agriculture (e.g. Kostov and Lingard, 2002 or Mathijs 
and Noev, 2004). After previous vertically integrated supply chains collapsed in the early 
transition years with privatization and company restructuring (see next section), vertical 
coordination recently has started to increase again only slowly, because of a combination 
of factors, such as rising standards and major market imperfections (Gow and Swinnen, 
1998, 2001). In these countries, public institutions are still ineffective in ensuring 
contract enforcement. The absence of enforceable contracts to set up any kind of vertical 
coordination has created difficulties. In addition, this creates severe barriers for price 
discovery, involving high transaction costs to coordinate market exchanges. Farmers in 
the CEE countries also face new issues arising from globalization. Similarly to the 
developed countries, a profound and rapid retail revolution can be observed. The 
emergence of the modern retailing sector in these countries leads to additional adjustment 
problems for agricultural producers, especially in sub-sectors dominated by fragmented 
and small-scale farms (Dries et al., 2004, Reardon and Swinnen, 2004). However, since 
the structure of the agrifood business has undergone a dramatic change since the 
beginning of the 1990s the impact of the internationalization of retailers is even more 
striking (Hanf and Dautzenberg, 2007). Recent research provides an excellent overview 
of the impacts of globalization of the food supply chain on small scale farmers in 
developing and transition countries (e.g. McCullough et al., 2008, Reardon et al., 2009, 
Swinnen, 2007, Vorley and Fearne, 2007). These studies highlight the importance of 
market imperfections on both product and input markets, hindering the farmers’ 
capability to access to modern supply chain. Econometrics focused empirical models of 
market power and price transmission analysis should provide additional insight into the 
in-between-market levels functioning of the agricultural supply chains. Conclusions 
however are mixed and sometimes contradictory. Considering the dairy sector, 
Hockmann and Vöneki, 2009, analysis the possibility of tacit collusion on the Hungarian 
raw milk market, using a structural equation model and reject the perfect competition null 
hypothesis. More recently, Bakucs e al., 2009 employs a unique firm level dataset to 
analyse the market power in the Hungarian dairy sector. Results support the earlier 
Hockmann and Vöneki, 2009 findings. Horizontal and more importantly vertical price 
transmission analysis on the Hungarian milk market (Bakucs et al., 2009 or Bakucs and 
Fertő 2008) show however that markets are well integrated, and results conclude the 
sector is not characterised by transmission asymmetries. Although there are no direct 
links between market power and price transmission analysis, one reason of possible 
asymmetries could well be the use of market power by processors or retailers.  In the light of the above presented inconclusiveness of empirical research, this paper 
analysis a specific issue of food supply chain, which has a pivotal role for the potential of 
farms to access the modern agro-food chains in transition countries: links to product 
markets. This issue also has important policy implications. First, increasing market 
saturation and growing concentration processes in retailing and processing have led to 
stronger competition within the different stages of the food chains. Together with market 
power, particularly located in the downstream sectors, these two factors might put 
pressure on agricultural prices and income, ultimately implying that traditional 
agricultural policy measures may not be efficient to maintain the farmers’ income 
 
The amount of literature on the role of contracts in agri-food chain is ever increasing. 
However, most theoretical and empirical research focuses on developed countries’ 
agriculture (e.g. Hueth et al., 1999; Goodhue 2000; Bogetoft and Olesen 2002; Goodhue 
et al., 2004; Fraser 2005). Recently, some studies have focused on various agricultural 
governance structures in transition countries employing various frameworks (e.g. 
Rudolph, 1999, Gow et al., 2000, Zaharieva et al., 2002, Fertő and Szabó, 2002), but 
studies concentrating on the role of contracts in transition agriculture are limited (Boger 
2001; Boger and Beckmann 2004). Fertő (2009) provides an overview on the recent 
literature on producers-buyers relationship in transition agriculture. 
 
In transition countries, where public institutions are ineffective when it comes to ensuring 
contract enforcement, price systems are generally still inefficient. The absence of 
enforceable contracts to set up any kind of relationship between farmers and food 
processors or retailers has become extremely difficult. Therefore, finding new partners 
for long run, relation-specific investments has been associated with high transaction costs 
for market players. In addition, this creates severe barriers for price discovery, involving 
high transaction costs when coordinating market exchanges. In those sub-sectors where 
any type of production contracts do exist, agricultural producers face hold-up problems 
(e.g. delayed payment for delivered products, or ex post price reduction by retailers), 
which are stressed by Gow and Swinnen (2000). Although food processors and retailers 
have significant market power, they also struggle to establish long-term relationships 
with farmers. 
 
The aim of this paper is to identify and explain farmers’ contract choice and contract 
design among various supply channels in transition agriculture by examining the 
Hungarian dairy sector using survey data. The paper is an extension of the previous work 
by Szabó and Bárdos (2006) on Hungarian milk sectors. Applying logit models, we 
present an empirical analysis of the key determinants of contracting choice based on 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). 
 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. The second section briefly reviews 
the literature on transaction cost economics and its implications on contracts, while 
Section 3 provides an overview on the Hungarian dairy sector. Survey design and the 
variables are described in Section 4, while results are presented in Section 5. The last 
section summarizes and offers some conclusions on the implications for the market 
mechanisms of Hungary’s beef sector. 2.  Transaction costs theory and contracts 
The theoretical framework for the analyses of the various aspects of the producers – 
buyers (processor or retailers) relationships can be divided into two groups. The first 
approach is based on the transaction cost economics. Transaction costs economics (TCE) 
claims that firm’s vertical boundaries decisions are determined by characteristics 
associated with efficiency of the chosen form of organisation (Williamson 1985). 
Williamson (1991) identifies three alternate forms of transaction governance: market, 
hybrid and hierarchy. The core prediction of the TCE is that the governance mode 
(market, hybrid and hierarchy) that minimises transaction costs is the preferred option. 
Transaction costs include the costs of negotiating and written contracts and the costs of 
monitoring and enforcing contractual performance. The theory focuses on identifying the 
characteristics of transactions that are best suited to a particular governance mode. The 
principal attributes of transactions, according to TCE are asset specificity (AS), 
uncertainty (U) and frequency (F). Together, these three attributes determine the 
following relationship (Ménard and Valceschini 2005) signs show the predicted impact of 
a positive variation of each characteristic on transaction costs:  
 
TC = f (AS, F, U)                           (1) 
    +   -   + 
 
The main general hypotheses of TCE in the relevant empirical literature are the 
following. First, as asset specificity increases, hybrids and hierarchies become preferred 
over markets. Second, when asset specificity is present to a considerable degree, 
uncertainty raises the transaction costs associated with market governance. Third, when 
both asset specificity and uncertainty are high, hierarchy is the most cost-effective 
governance mode. 
 
The various aspects of contract including contract decision, duration and contract design 
are also central theme in the TCE. However, the structure of contractual agreements may 
vary with the objectives of the contracting parties, underlying production relations, and 
the nature and size of informational and strategic impediments to contract formation and 
enforcement. As a consequence, the theory provides no unifying structure for the 
specification and testing of contract design hypotheses (Lyons 1996, Masten and Saussier 
2000). The empirical literature on contractual agreements in the CEE’s agriculture 
focuses on the following hypotheses. First, the likelihood of the long-term contractual 
agreements increases with the value of relationship-specific investments. Second, 
contractual relationship will be less formal and there will be less reliance on legal 
enforcement, the greater is the expectation that trade will continue into the future. Third, 
the existence of contract will increase with the frequency with which exchange takes 
place and the extent to which the transaction needs specific investments. Finally, the size 
of firms will be positively associated with the propensity to write formal contracts. In this paper we focus on analysing the determinants of the following five specific 
contracting choices: type of contract, duration of contract, number of contractors, 
incentive and business history (length of contractual relationships).  
 
3.  Dairy sector in Hungary  
After the fall of the socialist economic system, restructuring process in the Hungarian dairy 
sector began. One of the most notable phenomena was an exceptional decrease of the 
number of dairy farms. In the 1995-2007 period, the number of dairy farms in Hungary 
decreased by 59% leaving approximately 7500 dairy farms in the sector. The fall in the 
number of dairy cows was an immediate consequence. The number dropped from almost 
500 thousands in 1992 to 323 thousands in 2007.  Now, Hungarian raw milk production 
amounts to roughly 1.8 billion litres (around 180 litres per capita). In Hungary, milk is 
predominantly produced by agricultural enterprises. In 2005 their share in number of dairy 
cows accounted for 67% whereas family farms’ share was 33%. The average herd size in 
agricultural enterprises was 295 and on individual farms 6.2.  
The transformations in the processing sector during the transition period, lead to a quick 
consolidation of the industry. The number of dairy processing companies decreased from 
roughly 170 in 1996 to 58 in 2007. As a consequence, the concentration ratio increased, the 
C5 index reaching 60% in 2001 already, remaining around this level ever since. Much of the 
industry consolidation process was heavily relying on Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). 
FDI measured as share in owners’ equity exceeded 80 per cent already in 2000.  
The retail level however, followed a different path than the upstream levels of the sector. 
Due to several factors (privatisation, the emergence of multinational retail chains, high 
number of small private entrepreneurs) at the beginning of the transition period, the number 
of retail units rocketed from 25,000 in 1990 to 60,000 by the end of the decade. This trend 
was reversed after 2000 with a fast concentration process (by the end of 2007 the number of 
retail units fell back to 45,000), the main actors of the retail level becoming the super and 
hypermarkets. Now, the five largest retail companies account for two-thirds of grocery sales, 
whilst the ten largest for 90%, thus Hungary has a relatively high retail concentration 
amongst the New EU Member States, being close to the EU average. 
 
4.  The sample and key variables 
 
To investigate producers-processors contracting characteristics and to test the 
determinants of contracts, a questionnaire was designed and data were collected from 
Hungarian milk producers from each county. The aim was to obtain a database so that 
proxy variables could be constructed. The sample of 300 for the postal survey was 
selected from the 1900 members of the Hungarian Dairy Product Council (HDPC) 
consisting of 528 joint companies and 1368 producers delivering directly to processors. 
We cut the upper and lower 10% of the sample considering the quantity of the quota. On 
basis of milk quota, HDPC’s members own 75% of the total quota quantity. All members have some kind of contractual relationship(s) with the processors. 68 questionnaires were 
correctly filled and processed. The questions were classified into six groups with special 
respect to basic data of the farm, characteristics of contract(s) applied, bargaining power 
(of the producers), (changes of) relationships with trading partners, (specific) 
investments, as well as access to information. The preparation of the survey was assisted 
by the Hungarian Dairy Product Council (HDPC).  
The five dependent variables correspond to the five contracting choices analysed in this 
study: 
D1: Type of contract. The dependent binary variable takes the value of 1 if the contract is 
based on oral agreement only, and 0 if there exists a written formal contract.  
D2:  Duration of contract. The dependent binary variable takes the value of 1 if the 
contract is for more than a year, and 0 if shorter.  
D3:  Number of contractors. The dependent variable measures the number of 
organisations the farmer has contractual relationships with (1, 2 or 3).  
D4:  Incentive. The dependent binary variable takes the value of 1 if the contractor 
provides incentives (price premiums, fodder, cooling equipment, etc.) and 0 otherwise.  
D5: Business history. The dependent binary variable takes the value of 1 if the contractual 
relationship between farmer and processor is longer than a year and 0 otherwise. 
A large number of dependent variables were used to explain contracting choices: 
Cownumber  measures the size of the farm using the herd size as proxy, milk  is the 
quantity of milk in kilograms marketed in 2004, age  measures the age of farm 
owner/manager, education (values from 0 to 7) of farm owner/manager, level of trust 
towards the contractor (values from 1 to 5), pcontact (values from 1 to 5) measures the 
importance of personal contact between farmers and contractors, pinfluence (values from 
1 never to 5 often) measures whether the farmer can influence the purchase price, support 
(intensity level from 1 never to 5 often) measures whether the farm benefits from 
additional support (cooling equipment, credit, fodder etc.) from the contractor. The 
contractinv binary variable takes the value of 1 if there have been contractual relation 
specific investments on the farm (i.e. investments whose purpose is explicitly is the 
improvement of market business relationships), and 0 otherwise, investment is a binary 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the farmer plans to make investments on farm within a 
year, and 0 otherwise, lateinvestment is also a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the 
farmer plans to invest on medium-run (more than a year time span) and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, time is a complex variable measuring the time spent to gather price information 
and bargain with buyers per transaction. Takes the value of 1 if spent time per transaction 
is less than 30 minutes, 2 if it is less than an hour, 3 if between 1 – 3 hours, 4 if between 
3-5 hours, and 5 if longer. 
Therefore, the theoretical model we test is: 
Logit(D1,...,D5)=f(explanatory variables). 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables (number of 
observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values).  
 Table 1  Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables 
Variable  No. of Obs.  Mean   Std. Dev.   Min  Max 
cownumber 68  129.602  158.980  6  720 
milk 67  823626.4  1246813  13601  6300000 
age 68  43.955  17.333  29  70 
education 68  4.147  2.166  1  7 
trust 68  4.073  1.374  1  5 
pcontact 68  3.779  1.572  1  5 
pinfluence 68  1.411  0.717  1 4 
support 68  1.573  0.851  1  4 
contractinv 68  1.5  0.610 1  2 
investment 68  1.455  0.584 1 2 
lateinvestment 68  1.308  0.525  1  2 
time 68  2.117  1.178  1  5 
 
There are a number of interesting conclusions from the descriptive statistics. The average 
farm in the sample is fairly large, with almost 130 cows, the owner is on average 
educated, with agriculture specific degree, delivering on average 823 tons of milk/year. 
Contract related variables show the importance of trust (high, above 4 average, personal 
contact between farmer and processor, but it also shows the limited possibilities of 
farmers to influence prices (average 1.5 of maximum 4), and the limited additional 
support they might receive from contractors (1.5). Table 2 presents the frequency 
distribution of dependent variables representing contracting choices. 
Table 2  Frequency of dependent variables 
Value type  of 
contract 




0  51 54 -  13 12 
1  19 16 51 57 58 
2 - - 16  - - 
3 - - 1 - - 
 
Table 2 reveals most contracts being formal, written ones, but the length of these contract 
is mostly for a year only. The large majority of farmers have one contractor only at a 
given time 16 have to and only 1 has contractual relationships with 3 processors. The role 
of incentives is evident, 57 farmers taking advantage of buyer provided support. And 
finally, the frequencies of business history variable emphasize the importance of long 
term business relationships. 
 5.  Results 
Given the nature of the data collected and the various relationships to be examined, we 
estimate several logit models. All models and specification tests are estimated using 
STATA. The coefficient of determination (R
2) of regressions is between 15 and 20%, 
acceptable for this kind of analysis. 
1.  Type of contract 
The estimated coefficients of the logit model with respect to the choice between oral and 
forma, written contracts are presented in Table 3. Size (number of cows owned), age of 
farm manager, and the possibility of farmer to influence the purchase price are significant 
explanatory variables of the type of contract choice. 
 











2   0.1976 
Loglikelihood -30.684 
Note: ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10% 
 
Size has a moderate influence upon oral or formal contract choice, however it has the 
expected sign, i.e. larger farmers are more likely to choose written contracts than smaller 
ones. The coefficient of pinfluence is plausibly positive, indicating that the possibility of 
influencing prices is possible where oral contracts exist only. One would expect the level 
of trust between the farmer and contractor to play an important role in the choice of oral 
or formal contracts. However in this regression, the trust variable does not appear to 
significantly influence the type of contract. Finally, age plays a significant role in the 
choice between oral and formal contracts. Older farmers seem to prefer oral contracts in 
favour of written ones. 
 
2.  Duration of contract 
The determinants of whether the contract agreement is valid for more than a year are 
presented in table 4. Significant determinants are the size (cownumber), whether the 
farmer plans to make investments on farm (investment) and the level of to which extent 
the farmer is able to influence the purchase price (pinfluence). The effect of farm size is again moderate but with the expected sign, suggesting that larger farms are more likely to 
have longer than a year contracts. Contrary to our expectation, the coefficient of 
investment variable is negative, resulting that farmers planning to make within a year 
investments on the farm are more likely to choose one year contracts. Similarly, the 
ability of farmer to influence purchase prices is more possible with shorter contracts than 
longer ones. Contracts spanning a longer time period are likely to be more detailed with 
fixed purchase prices, therefore farmers hoping to exercise a positive influence upon 
purchase prices are probably choosing shorter duration contracts. Again, amongst the 
non-significant variables, the variable measuring the level of trust towards the contractor 
is surprisingly not significant.  
 











2   0.1398 
Loglikelihood -29.740 
Note: ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10% 
 
3.  Number of contractors 
Table 2 shows that most farmers in the sample have one contract at a given 
time, few have 2 and only one has 3 parallel contracts. The ordered logit 
regression of the determinants of contract numbers are presented in table 5. 
Size (cownumber) has again the expected sign, suggesting larger farmers make business 
with one purchaser/processor whilst for smaller ones is easier to have several parallel 
contracts. Significant determinants of number of contracts are whether the farmer plans to 
make contract specific investments on farm (contractinv), level of trust and the time spent 
with gathering information and bargaining contract options (time). With the exception of 
time, significant coefficients have the right sign, indicating that contract relating 
investments strengthen the business relationship between contractor and farmer, the latter 
choosing less parallel contracts. Trust has a large significant negative coefficient, 
indicating that if the buyer is trusted, there is no need for more contracts with other 
purchasers. Framers with a low level of trust towards the downstream markets prefer 
more than one contract, thus spreading possible contract or contract enforcement related 
risks. The duration of price information and bargaining contract details has an unexpected positive sign, suggesting that the complexity of contract negotiation leads to more 
contracts. 
 
Table 5  Logit models: number of contractors 









2   0.1702 
Loglikelihood   -34.887 
Note: ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10% 
 
 
With ordered logit regressions, for the validity of results, it is required to reject the 
parallel regression hypothesis. The chi square statistic with 6 degrees of freedom equals 
12.67, corresponding to 0.048 probability. Thus we may reject the parallel regressions 
null hypothesis, allowing performing an unbiased ordered logit regression.  
4.  Incentive 
The role of contractor provided incentives is analysed in this section. Table 6 presents the 
determinants of contract choice from this perspective. 
 










2    0.1581 
Loglikelihood -23.772 
Note: ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10% 
 
The quantity of milk delivered, whether the farmer has long-run plans of performing 
investments on farm (lateinvestment) and the time needed for information gathering and 
contract bargaining proved to be significant variables. Those farmers planning to make 
longer run investments on farm are more likely to prefer incentives. Even though it is 
significant, the coefficient of milk is only marginally different from zero, suggesting that farmers delivering larger quantities of milk are less likely to go for the incentive contract 
option. The coefficient of time variable is positive, plausibly suggesting that it is more 
likely that contracts providing incentives take longer to agree upon.  
 
5.  Business history 
Table 2 shows that most farmers have a longer than a year business relationship with the 
downstream industry. Coefficients and significance level of variables determining the 
business history, i.e. whether the farmer has longer or shorter than a year contract 
relationship with the contractor are presented in table 7. 
 











2   0.1956 
Loglikelihood -25.490 
Note: ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10% 
 
Significant variables are whether the farmer plans medium-run investments on farm, level 
of trust, the possibility of farmer to influence the purchase price and the time required on 
average to gather price information and bargain contract options. Variable coefficients 
have the right sign, suggesting that complex and long contract bargaining process 
decreases the business history, i.e. farmers prefer quick negotiations. The possibility of 
farmers to influence prices has negative effect upon longer business history. One possible 
explanation of this result could be that farmers are easily changing business partners if 
they think they will be able to influence purchase prices through new partners and 
contracts.  
6.  Conclusions 
We analysed the contracting choice of Hungarian dairy farmers using survey data. We 
focused on the determinants of choice between five different contract options, type of 
contract, duration of contract, number of contracts, incentives provided in the contract 
and business history of the partners. A list of logit models provided largely significant 
estimation coefficients. With a few exceptions the sign of coefficients is according to 
theory or indeed common sense. Most important results can be summarised as follows: 
(1) older farmers, with the expectation to influence purchase prices are more likely to 
choose oral contracts, whilst larger farmers marginally though, but favour written, formal contracts. (2) larger farmers prefer longer contracts, however those farmers who believe 
they may influence purchase prices choose shorter than a year contracts. Contrary to 
expectations, short-run investments on farm do not positively influence the choice of 
longer contracts. With more half of farmers in the sample planning within a year farm 
investments, one would theoretically expect that investing farmers wish to secure income 
for longer time periods giving up their possibilities of influencing purchase prices. (3) in 
line with results of similar empirical studies, larger farmers and those planning contract 
specific investment on farm prefer one contractor. The role of trust is important, if the 
buyer is trusted there is no need for parallel contracts. (4) The incentives provided by the 
contract is important choice for those planning long run investments. Negotiating 
incentive contracts needs significantly more information and bargain time than other 
contracts. (5) finally, the analysis of business history between farmer and contractor   
provided mixed results. Although 58 farmers in the sample have longer than a year and 
only 12 other contracts, some the signs of logit regression coefficients seem to be against 
intuition. Those farmers, who plan loner-run investments and have a high level of trust 
towards contractors seem to shift between business partners more often. Longer than a 
year contracts indeed take more time to agree upon. This study hopefully ads to the better 
understanding of farmers’ contracting choices in a CEE country, Hungary. 
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